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This study investigates the role of social networks in aligning the incentives of economic agents in
settings with incomplete contracts. We study the New York City taxi industry where taxis are often
leased and lessee-drivers have worse driving outcomes than owner-drivers as a result of a moral hazard
associated with incomplete leasing contracts. Using instrumental variables and fixed-effects analyses,
we find that: (1) drivers leasing from members of their country-of-birth community exhibit significantly
reduced effects of moral hazard; (2) network effects appear to operate primarily via social sanctions;
and (3) network benefits can help to explain the organization of the industry in terms of which drivers
and owners form business relationships.
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
When an economic agent does not bear the full cost or full fruit of her actions, a moral 
hazard may arise in which the agent, through doing what is personally optimal, behaves in ways 
that are sub-optimal from a social standpoint (Holmstrom 1979). Moral hazard plays a central 
role in our understanding of numerous contractual relationships and researchers have found 
evidence consistent with moral hazard in many contexts.
1 The standard approach to alleviating 
moral hazard is to use contracts that align the incentives of the agent and principal; for example, 
paying workers in stock options to induce them to care about the welfare of the company or 
requiring collateral to reduce borrowers' incentives to default. However, in many settings, such 
as those with poor access to collateral, such options are not available. 
The use of contracts that exploit social ties, within which monitoring costs are low and 
members can apply social sanctions on each other, has been proposed as a way to enhance the 
willingness of individuals to act in the interest of the broader society (Stiglitz 1990). However, 
Banerjee, Besley, and Guinnane (1994), Besley and Coate (1995), and Wydick (1996) argue that 
a sufficient strong and credible threat of social sanctions against a defaulting group member may 
be necessary to deter moral hazard in a credit contract, suggesting that it is the strength of group 
pressure against potential defaulters that matters rather than social ties per se. Karlan, Mobius, 
Rosenblat, and Szeidl (2009) model network connections between individuals as generating 
"social collateral" that facilitates secure informal borrowing and they document that network 
strength predicts informal borrowing in Peru. In their model, the possibility of losing valuable 
friendships secures informal transactions the same way that the possibility of losing physical 
                                                 
1 For example, worker effort and productivity are higher when workers are paid by a piece rate versus an hourly 
wage (Foster and Rosenzweig 1994, Lazear 2000), farm field work may be mechanized when supervisory 
monitoring costs of workers are high (Smith 1986), and make-versus-buy patterns in the trucking industry may 
reflect an inability of firms to ensure the efficient use of their resources (Baker and Hubbard 2003, 2004).   3 
collateral can secure formal lending. Altruism between group members has also been identified 
as a nonmarket channel through which incentives are aligned (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993).  
Virtually all the empirical evidence that social ties might mitigate moral hazard is in the 
group-lending context in developing countries (where markets are not well defined, credit is 
constrained, and property rights are not well enforced). Moreover this evidence is mixed.
2,3 
Given the central role that moral hazard plays in explaining the structure of contracts in various 
domains, and a theoretical literature highlighting that contractual arrangements that exploit social 
ties might mitigate moral hazard, it is important to provide empirical evidence on these issues in 
a developed nation context, in a well defined market, and outside of the microcredit context. As 
such, we aim to extend the scope of the empirical literature on the importance of social ties in 
mitigating moral hazard by presenting the first clean evidence that social ties reduce moral 
hazard in a labor market setting in the United States. Specifically, we analyze the outcomes of 
New York City taxi drivers who lease (as opposed to own) their taxis and compare the outcomes 
of those who lease from an owner from the same country of birth to the outcomes of those who 
lease from an owner from a different country of birth. 
The taxi leasing market is a prime candidate for studying moral hazard because lessee-
drivers pay less or none of many of the variable costs they generate, including vehicle 
                                                 
2 To our knowledge, the only empirical studies on the ability of social networks to reduce moral hazard outside of 
group lending are Greif (1993), who finds that community enforcement was effective at limiting moral hazard in 
11
th-century Mediterranean trade; and Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2005, 2009), who find that social connections 
lead to a misallocation of effort and hence lower productivity among college student fruit pickers. Gil and Hartmann 
(2011) provide evidence on market organization through social networks in response to moral hazard, which we 
discuss later in the section. 
3 This ability of social ties to reduce moral hazard is argued to be largely responsible for the success of group-
lending banks such as the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh (Pitt and Khandker 1998 and Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, 
and Kinnan 2009). Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994) study theoretically how community enforcement may operate, 
while Sharma and Zeller (1997), Karlan (2007), and Ahlin and Townsend (2007) provide additional empirical 
evidence about how social ties operate in group-lending, though Giné and Karlan (2006, 2009) find no benefit to 
group versus individual lending. Social interactions have been identified as determinants of economic actions in 
other contexts as well (for example, Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan 2000, Glaeser, Liabson, Scheinkman, and 
Soutter 2000, Duflo and Saez 2003, Karlan 2005, Mas and Moretti 2009, and Jackson and Bruegmann 2009).   4 
maintenance, repair, replacement, and insurance, and hence have incentives to choose inefficient 
levels of vehicle usage, care, and risk. The heart of the problem is that a lessee-driver’s driving 
style cannot be monitored at reasonable cost, and hence the ability to specify in the leasing 
contract the driver’s level of vehicle care is limited.
4 
As a result of these contracting limitations, Schneider (2010) finds significantly higher 
rates of accidents and driving violations for lessee-drivers versus drivers who own their taxis due 
to moral hazard. The NYC taxi driver labor market is also uniquely well suited for the study of 
social ties because most NYC taxi owners and drivers are immigrants to the United States, with 
owners representing 112 countries and drivers representing 146 countries, which allows us to 
compare outcomes both within and across numerous country-of-birth social networks. 
  To present some of the first evidence that social ties can mitigate the effects of moral 
hazard in a labor market and developed country setting we compare the driving outcomes of 
drivers who lease from owners from the same country of birth (in-network) to the driving 
outcomes of drivers who lease from owners from a different country of birth (out-of-network). 
We use country of birth as our measure of social connectedness because this has been found to 
be an important social connection in other contexts. For example, country-of-birth networks have 
been found to be important for immigrant assimilation (Borjas 2000) and job seeking (Munshi 
2003, Edin, Fredriksson, and Aslund 2003).
5 
To guide the interpretation of the empirical results, we lay out the theoretical reasons why 
the outcomes of in-network versus out-of-network drivers may vary: first, owners may be better 
positioned to identify and hire high ability drivers when they are in-network; second, in-network 
                                                 
4 Drivers however keep all fare revenue so effort to generate fares for the owner is not relevant in this context. 
5 Granoveter (1974), Montgomery (1991), Fernandez and Weinberg (1997), and Pellizzari (2004) are other studies 
on the role of social networks in employment search.   5 
drivers may exert more effort in their driving style to limit the costs borne by the owner. These 
effort effects could be due to several factors, including social sanctions, social collateral, social 
preferences, or a better ability of owners to monitor drivers. To formalize these notions, we 
present a search model connecting owners to drivers that gives the following empirical 
predictions: (a) in the presence of either better screening or higher effort for in-network drivers, 
in-network driving may be prevalent; (b) there is positive/negative selection of drivers into in-
network driving based on their ability if the results are driven by screening/effort effects; and (c) 
in the presence/absence of effort effects there exists a positive/no relationship between in-
network driving and driving outcomes (after taking selection on ability into account).
6 
  The empirical difficulty in isolating the causal (effort) effect of in-network driving is that 
in-network drivers may differ from out-of-network drivers in important unobserved ways. 
Because this paper is not based on experimental variation our approach is not to provide one 
single estimate of the causal effect from a single research design, but to present a compelling 
body of evidence based on three credible but imperfect research designs that rely on distinct 
sources of variation and rely on different identifying assumptions.  
Our first approach is to aggregate the data to the country-of-birth level to compare the 
outcomes of drivers from countries with high rates of in-network driving to drivers from 
countries with low rates of in-network driving ─ removing any bias due to selection within a 
network; that is, selection that leads one driver to lease in-network and another to lease out-of-
network from the same country of birth. Our second strategy exploits longitudinal data to 
compare the change in outcomes of drivers who switch from driving in-network to out-of 
network (and vice versa) over time to the outcomes of drivers who always drive in-network or 
                                                 
6 Note that we use the term ability broadly to indicate intrinsic driver characteristics that affect the driving outcomes 
of interest. These characteristics include motor skills and also factors such as conscientiousness.   6 
never drive in-network over the same time period ─ removing any bias due to high ability drivers 
being more or less likely to lease in-network. Our third strategy exploits cross-sectional variation 
in the residential locations of drivers relative to owners from the same country of birth. Under the 
assumption that the distance from a driver’s residence to the nearest same-country owner’s 
residence is unrelated to underlying driver ability (an assumption for which we present empirical 
support), we use this distance measure as an exogenous instrument for driving in-network while 
also conditioning on the place-of birth-network. That is, we compare the outcomes of drivers 
who lease in-network because they live close to an in-network owner to those of drivers who 
lease out-of-network because they do not live close to an in-network owner.  
  Although none of these research designs is dispositive, the combination of evidence is 
compelling because these estimation strategies control for and are subject to different sources of 
bias. Specifically, if our effects are driven by selection within a place-of-birth network, they 
would disappear once we aggregate to the place-of-birth level to rely exclusively on variation 
across place-of-birth networks. However, if the results are driven by selection across place-of-
birth networks (which would bias our aggregate results), then they would disappear in models 
that condition on the place-of-birth network of the driver. Also, if the results are driven by 
sample selection or survivorship bias (which would bias the aggregate results) then they would 
disappear in models that use within-driver variation. Finally, if the results are driven by changes 
in driver ability that co-vary with changes in in-network driving status (which would bias the 
within-driver estimates), then the results would disappear in the instrumental variables and the 
country-level models. As such, while each strategy individually may be subject to some form of 
selection bias, it is highly implausible that all three sources of variation are. Therefore, consistent   7 
results across these methodologies would indicate a real causal effect. We additionally provide 
supporting robustness checks related to all of these approaches. 
We first find that, consistent with there being an important benefit to driving in-network, 
in-network driving is much more common than would be expected by random chance, and 
cannot be explained by residential clustering by country of birth. That is, the patterns are 
consistent with the taxi industry organizing around social networks to mitigate agency problems. 
We then find that across all three strategies that account for selection, drivers have better 
outcomes when driving in-network versus out-of-network ─ indicative of a real causal effort 
effect. Our naive OLS estimates are smaller than in all three models that account for selection, 
indicating negative selection into in-network driving as predicted by the theoretical model under 
effort effects and inconsistent with the model under screening. To provide further evidence that 
our effects operate through the mitigation of moral hazard, we split out in-network effects by 
summons type and find the largest effects for types directly affecting owners’ costs (as opposed 
to drivers' costs which would be internalized by the driver).This provides further support that 
selection is not driving our results. 
Finally, given the large apparent effort effects, we investigate the likely mechanisms at 
play. We use as a measure of owner/driver network strength the density of residents in the 
owner’s/driver’s immediate neighborhood from the same country of birth, and find that the 
marginal effects of driving in-network increase with the strength of the owner’s network but not 
the driver’s network, and that in-network effects are weak when the owner’s network strength is 
weak. These patterns are consistent with the presence of social sanctions in the form of 
community-enforced punishments, which would likely emanate from the owner’s and not the 
driver’s network, but inconsistent with altruism, which should operate independently of the   8 
owner’s network. 
Our results support the findings in Gil and Hartmann (2011) who also show that markets 
may organize around common-origin communities to mitigate agency problems. Our study 
improves upon Gil and Hartmann by examining richer data for identifying market organization, 
and also by providing evidence directly that social networks reduce moral hazard. That is, we 
actually observe important benefits to organizing around social networks.  
More generally, this paper adds breadth to the literature on social networks and moral 
hazard by being the first study (to our knowledge) to show directly the potential of social 
networks to reduce moral hazard in a labor market context and in a developed nation. Also given 
that the micro-credit literature is mixed, this study contributes to this literature by providing 
compelling evidence that social networks can reduce moral hazard. The current results are 
particularly interesting because the New York City taxi industry offers a practical alternative to 
taxi leasing that alleviates most of the moral hazard problem: An active credit market exists in 
which specialized lenders specifically market loans to taxi drivers to buy their own vehicles. 
Thus, even in a setting in which credit is available, transactions are commonplace among 
members of the same country network, indicating that social networks significantly reduce the 
cost of using the market. We can infer that social networks would be even more valuable if 
contracting alternatives were not available. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives background on the New York 
City taxi industry. Section 3 describes the data. Sections 4 and 5 provide the theoretical and 
empirical frameworks that underlie our analysis. Section 6 describes the main results. Section 7 
examines how social ties may operate in the current context. Section 8 concludes. 
   9 
2.  THE NEW YORK CITY TAXI INDUSTRY 
Licenses and driving arrangements 
To operate a taxi in New York City, a driver must possess a taxi license (often called a 
medallion).
7 There are two types of taxi licenses: An "owner-must-drive" license, which requires 
the license owner to be a full-time driver (specifically, to drive at least 210 shifts of at least nine 
hours per year); and a corporate license, which is free of owner-driving requirements and 
typically is owned by corporations that lease the licenses (often with vehicles) to drivers. The 
two license type are immutable. Except in rare instances, new licenses have not been issued since 
the 1930s, leading to an active trade in the existing licenses between private parties for hundreds 
of thousands of dollars each. 
Under this licensing structure, drivers can operate in three ways: Owner-driving, in which 
the driver owns the license and vehicle; driver-owned-vehicle-driving (DOV-driving), in which 
the driver leases the license but owns the vehicle; and lessee-driving, in which the driver leases 
both the license and vehicle. Lessee-drivers can operate under either long-term leases, which 
typically extend for six months at a time, or short-term leases, which are twelve hours long. 
Taxis are typically operated by two drivers for two shifts per day (a day and night shift). Thus, a 
taxi is typically operated by two lessee-drivers, two owner-drivers who co-own the taxi, or one 
owner-driver and one lessee-driver who leases from this owner-driver. 
For reasons explained below, the drivers we examine are primarily lessee-drivers 
operating under this third type of driving arrangement, where the owner-driver operates the taxi 
for one shift twelve-hour shift per day and a lessee-driver who leases the taxi (both the license 
and vehicle) from the owner-driver operates the taxis for the second twelve-hour shift per day. 
                                                 
7 Much of the information in this section comes from personal discussions with industry participants, TLC Rules 
documents made available by the TLC, and Urbanomics (2004).   10 
Discussions with industry participants indicate that owner-drivers often find lessees through 
family-members, neighbors, and friends, though anonymous matches are also common. 
The costs and revenues of operation are split between the lessee-driver and the owner-
driver as follows. The owner is required by the TLC to pay for no-fault and liability insurance 
($7,000 to $13,000 per year) and workers’ compensation for the lessee-driver ($1,400 to $3,000 
per year), licensing fees (approximately $1,000 per year), vehicle inspections ($50), and fines for 
improper usage of the taxi, some of which may be due to the lessee’s actions. Owners also pay 
for all vehicle maintenance and repair ($4,000 to $10,000 per year) and for vehicle replacement 
(approximately $28,000).
8 Repairs are typically conducted at garages chosen by the owner-driver 
that specialize in servicing taxis but are also sometimes conducted at other garages. 
Lessees pay for their own gas usage ($5,000 to $10,000 per year), tolls, parking tickets, 
fines for DMV and TLC violations, and TLC fees (approximately $100 per year) that they 
themselves generated. Lessees also pay a flat lease fee to the owner. The lease fee is capped by 
the TLC at a maximum amount that owners can charge lessees per lease period, which industry 
participants indicate is respected in practice and nearly always binds (TLC (2006)). Lessees often 
provide a modest deposit, which is sometimes forfeited to the owner if the lessee has an at-fault 
accident. During the sample period, the deposit amount was capped by the TLC at $500 for long-
term lessees.
9 Lessee-drivers keep all fares and tips that they generate.  
Measures of owners’ costs that are generated by drivers 
As described above, lessee-drivers generate three types of costs that are borne by taxi 
                                                 
8 Note that is the vehicle owner who pays all repair costs. Since we are primarily examining drivers who lease from 
owner-drivers, it is these owner-drivers who pay repair costs. 
9 There exist industry programs that could provide incentives for better driving outcomes (they stipulate license 
suspension and revocation for repeated violations), but they have typically not been enforced. Another program 
reduces insurance premium if all lessees of the medallion have a good driving record.   11 
owners, which we discuss in detail now. The first is repair costs associated with vehicle 
mechanical failures and other maintenance work. Given that New York City taxis are operated in 
heavily congested urban conditions for an average of 175 miles per day, the driver’s level of 
vehicle care can quickly show up in vehicle condition.
10 The second type of cost is from 
accidents. Approximately one-third of taxis are involved in a serious accident per year (defined 
as having over $1000 in damage or involves injuries). Again, driver aggressiveness such as 
speeding or cutting across traffic to pick up a hailing passenger (a common site in Manhattan) 
increases the likelihood of accidents. The third type of cost is for fines to owners stemming from 
driver behavior. Owners receive fines ranging from $25 to $100 per instance when drivers do not 
adequately record information on passenger trips they provide, when the vehicle is not in 
satisfactory condition, either regarding cleanliness or safety, and when items such as the driver’s 
taxi license are not properly displayed.
11 
Drivers typically pay little or none of the repair and maintenance costs, a fraction or none 
of the costs of an accident, and only a fraction of the costs of fines from violations given they do 
not pay the owner’s portion (drivers may receive a fine themselves for failing to adequately 
record trip information, keep the taxi in good condition, or properly display all required 
information). However, drivers keep all the fare revenues they generate. Given that revenues and 
costs are increasing in driver aggressiveness, we can see that drivers face a moral hazard. 
 
3.  THE DATA 
                                                 
10 For example, in conversations with taxi owners, some indicated to us that the brakes must be replaced every few 
weeks. Whether the driver is aggressively accelerating and braking, taking care to avoid potholes and curbs, and so 
on can have an important effect on an owner’s repair costs. 
11 New York City police has jurisdiction over enforcing many New York City taxi regulations, and the violations are 
typically assigned during police stops of the taxi during regular taxi operation.   12 
A.  Description of the TLC data 
Data were provided by the TLC under a proprietary data-sharing agreement and contain 
information about all drivers of New York City yellow taxis during two time periods: the spring 
of 2005 and fall of 2007. The 2005 data contain driver-level records on three types of driving 
outcomes: Accidents, convictions, and summonses. The accident records describe all accidents 
involving taxis with injuries or property damage exceeding $1000 to any vehicle involved. The 
violations records describe all drivers’ convictions for driving violations during taxi operation for 
which points are issued against a DMV driver’s license. The summons records describe all 
summonses, which are issued for TLC violations (as opposed to DMV driving violations) such 
as passenger service refusals, using the taxi for unlawful purpose, and missing required items 
from the taxi such as the display of the driver’s taxi-driving license. 
The 2007 data only contain records for the summons outcomes and not the accident and 
violations outcomes (the latter outcomes originate from the New York City police department, 
and were not available for 2007).
12 In addition to being available only for 2005, the accidents and 
convictions records also have more limited variation than the summons records. Approximately 
24 percent of drivers receive at least one summons during a six-month period versus 14 percent 
having a conviction and 4 percent having an accident. Because of the added power for tests, and 
its panel nature, we focus our analysis on summonses. However, we are careful to show that our 
results are robust for accidents and convictions. 
Summonses are given for a range of TLC violations. Some of these driver violations 
generate costs for owners directly: owners receive fines for missing items, missing trip records, 
and vehicle condition violations stemming from the actions of drivers to whom they lease. Some 
                                                 
12 We top-code outcomes to three to limit the impact of outliers, though less than one percent of drivers are affected.   13 
of these driver violations generate costs for owners indirectly: using the taxi for an unlawful 
purpose may risk the taxi (for example, temporary impounding), hazardous moving violations, 
and possibly shift violations, in particular smoking in the taxi. Some driver violation may not 
affect owner costs directly, but may reflect general driving style and also level of vehicle usage. 
Since violations frequency likely increases monotonically with usage, and lessee-drivers may 
operate their taxis for longer than owner-drivers because they do not pay the full cost of 
operation, higher usage may also reflect moral hazard. 
The driver-level data also record each driver’s country of birth and 2005 address, and for 
drivers entering after 1997, whether the driver passed an English-language test and his score on a 
written driving test, both of which the driver must pass to obtain a taxi-driving license.
13 We 
calculate a driver’s New York City taxi-driving experience from the number of months 
registered as an active New York City taxi driver, which we derive from his taxi driver’s license 
numbers.
14 Driver-level records are available for both lessee-drivers and owner-drivers. 
Two driver-of-record files identify the taxi each long-term lessee-driver and owner-driver 
was registered to operate on April 2, 2005 and October 21, 2007, which we use to merge the 
driver and owner data.
15 Owners receive a significant discount on insurance premiums when they 
register specific “named-drivers” with the TLC and the insurance provider. These named-drivers 
are then the exclusive operators of that taxi (including the owner himself when he drives), and 
                                                 
13 The English-language test is aimed to ensure that drivers can communicate with passengers, while the written 
driving test is on New York City geography and DMV and TLC regulations. 
14 Taxi-driving license numbers are issued sequentially, which allows us to identify when a license was issued. We 
thank Bruce Schaller for providing this algorithm. 
15 Taxis not in the driver-of-record file have “unspecified” drivers, and TLC officials and industry participants 
indicate they are nearly always short-term lessees. Since short-term lessees operate different taxis every day, they 
cannot be matched in the data to specific taxis and hence owner countries, and are excluded from the analysis.   14 
these matches constitute the driver-of-record file.
16 Taxis with such named-drivers represent 
9,535 of the 12,779 taxis in 2005 and 9,025 of the 12,953 taxis in 2007. Since we only know the 
driver-taxi match on these two dates, we restrict the majority of the analysis to the periods 
surrounding these dates. 
For the long-term lessees, the driver-of-record files record the current lease period, which 
typically are six months intervals (50 percent are between 177 and 183 days long, and 95 percent 
are between 147 and 189 days long). We match the dates of offense for the summons, 
convictions, and accidents to these lease periods to identify the drivers’ outcomes associated with 
particular taxis. To make the driving outcomes comparable across drivers with different lease 
period lengths, we use the recorded lengths to normalize the number of incidences to 182 days. 
We supplement the TLC data with Census data on driver/owner neighborhood 
characteristics, most importantly the fraction of residents in the driver/owner Census tract from 
the same country of birth (resident country of birth is only reported at the tract level), which we 
match to drivers/owners using their addresses.
17 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the primary variables of interest for our sample. It 
shows that drivers have 11 years of NYC taxi-driving experience on average, that almost half of 
drivers lease in-network, and that approximately one in three drivers receives a summons, one in 
six has a conviction, and one in twenty has a serious accident per six month period. 
B.  Discussion of driving outcome measures 
                                                 
16 Because of the large financial incentives to accurately report named-drivers, we believe these records are accurate. 
Furthermore, summonses for inaccurate named-driver records are very infrequent. 
17 The country of birth recorded in the TLC data is occasionally more precise than the country of birth in the Census 
data. For example, the Census and TLC data both record the European countries, England, Ireland, Sweden, Austria, 
France, Germany, Netherlands, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Czech Republic or Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, and Yugoslavia. However, the TLC data record the additional European 
countries, Belgium, Switzerland, Monaco, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldova. These additional countries are 
assigned to the Census categories, “Other western Europe,” “Other southern Europe,” and “Other eastern Europe.”   15 
Our data do not contain measures of vehicle maintenance, repair, and replacement costs 
borne by the owner.
18 Instead as mentioned above we examine three measures that either directly 
or indirectly reflect costs generated by the driver but that are borne by the owner. One measure is 
accidents, which, unlike maintenance and repairs, can be attributed directly to individual drivers. 
The second measure is convictions for driving violations, such as speeding or disobeying other 
traffic laws, which are enforced and processed in the same way as ordinary motorists’ driving 
violations. Both accidents and convictions directly reflect driver ability and aggressiveness, and 
hence are likely to reflect on average risk for owners from unsafe driving. In fact, Gebers (2003) 
finds that prior violations more accurately predict future accidents than prior accidents 
themselves (which is also a strong predictor of future accidents). 
Our third measure is summons, which are issued for TLC violations (as opposed to DMV 
driving violations) based on a driver’s action for which owners receive fines directly, such as 
when a required item is missing from the taxi like the driver’s taxi-driving license (as mentioned 
above), and also for actions for which the owner does not directly receive a fine, for example for 
failing to satisfy a reasonable passenger request or smoking in the taxi, which reflects a general 
tendency regarding conscientious versus careless driving. We believe some types of summons 
better reflect a driver’s driving style and conscientiousness than others. However, we have no 
way to identify precisely which summons types are most reflective, and hence we aggregate all 
summonses for the primary analysis. However we also provide results broken out by summons 
type to show that individual types indeed conform to our expectations of which are more likely 
to be susceptible to moral hazard. 
C.  Availability of country-of-birth data 
                                                 
18 This data would not reveal directly the costs generated by the lessee-driver anyway since attributing repair costs to 
the owner-driver versus the lessee-driver would be challenging given both operate the taxi nearly every day.   16 
Our primary analysis relies on country-of-birth data being available for both the lessee-
driver and also the owner from whom he leases. Country data for both parties must be present to 
identify whether the driver is leasing from a same-country owner. Table 2 reports the numbers of 
drivers with available country data for both the driver and owner, along with mean New York 
City taxi driving experience of these drivers.
19 
The table shows that country data for both the lessee and owner are available for 1,955 
and 2,053 lessees in the 2005 and 2007 data respectively, and that lessees with country data have 
only slightly more experience than lessees without data. Drivers with country data also have a 
similar distribution over race than drivers without country data (not shown in the table), 
suggesting that the distribution over countries is similar for drivers with and without country 
data.
20 Drivers with and without country data also have similar English-language and driving-test 
results (also not shown). Therefore, based on the observable driver characteristics that are 
available to us, we have no reason to believe that the drivers that we analyze are systematically 
different than the drivers for which country data are missing. 
Most lessee-drivers with available country data for both the driver and the owner share a 
taxi with an owner-driver (that is, they operate owner-driver taxis, as opposed to non-owner-
driver taxis).
21 Thus, the sample we analyze consists primarily of lessee-drivers who lease from 
owner-drivers. This sample is attractive for studying social networks because owner-drivers are 
most likely to be invested in the condition of their vehicle (since they drive most days) and 
                                                 
19 Note that Table 1 reports slightly fewer observations than Table 2 because Table 1 reports summary statistics only 
for observations for which country-level data are available and data are non-missing for all other variables used in 
the regression analysis, while Table 2 only examines the number of drivers for which country data are available 
regardless of the availability of other variables. 
20  Fifty-four, 23, and 13 percent of drivers with country data were Asian (including South Asian), Black, and White, 
respectively, while 58, 22, and 8 percent of drivers without country data were Asian, Black and White. 
21 The reason country data are available primarily only for lessee-drivers on owner-driver taxis is because country 
data are available for most drivers, including owner-drivers, but not for non-driving owners.   17 
interact with the lessee regularly, thereby facilitating a social connection, as opposed to non-
driving owners, who often own many hundreds of taxis, and hence likely have more anonymous 
relationships with drivers regardless of whether they share a common country of birth. Table 2 
shows that a small fraction of lessee-drivers that have country-level data available lease from 
non-driving owners and hence are included in our sample. The results throughout are similar and 
modestly stronger when they are excluded.
22 
 
4.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
  There are two important potential benefits of in-network driving. The first is better 
screening such that owners can better assess the ability of drivers from the same country and as 
such are more likely to hire drivers from the same country. The second is that drivers from the 
same country exert higher levels of effort than drivers who lease from owners from a different 
country (we explain reasons for this in greater detail below). 
A.  Potential benefits of in-network leasing 
Even in the case where in-network drivers do not exert more effort than out-of-network 
drivers, one might observe high rates of in-network leasing and different driving outcomes on 
average for in-network drivers versus out-of-network drivers. This would be due to screening. 
i.  The screening technology may be better in network. Specifically, due to information flows 
about prospective drivers via the country-of-birth network, owners may be better able to 
determine the ability of same-country drivers versus different-country drivers, and therefore 
select different ability drivers for in-network versus out-of-network. 
                                                 
22 Note that we do not examine owner-driver outcomes in the main text of this study because we are interested in 
comparing in-network versus out-of-network lessee-drivers. However, owner-driver results are available in 
Schneider (2010) as well as the online appendix.   18 
There are a few reasons why all else equal drivers who lease from an owner from the same 
country of birth might exert higher levels of effort than drivers who do not. 
ii.  Social preferences on the part of drivers may lead drivers to exhibit more altruistic behavior 
toward owners from the same country versus owners from a different country. It is well 
documented that people tend to be willing to give up some of their own material self-interest 
in order to improve the welfare of others with whom they have close social ties.
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iii. Social ties may create social collateral (Karlan, Mobius, Rosenblat, and Szeidl 2009) such 
that individuals derive positive utility from ties and have a disincentive to behave in ways 
that harm them. Benefits may be non-pecuniary, such as enjoying a friendship or gaining 
spousal prospects, or arrive in the future, such as having a resource for job information or a 
loan in times of need. Persons from the same country are much more likely to have a strong 
social tie and hence have significant social collateral than persons from different countries. 
iv. Individuals are better able to impose social sanctions on others from the same group versus a 
different group. For the same reasons that social collateral creates a disincentive to behave in 
ways that harm a relationship, group membership creates disincentives to behave in ways that 
lead others to exclude one from the benefits of membership. In the current context, owners 
have more leverage over drivers from the same country versus a different country, leading 
drivers to exert more effort toward the objectives of same-country owners, all else equal. 
v.  Owners’ costs of monitoring the behavior of drivers might be lower for drivers from the 
same country versus a different country given the more frequent interactions between driver 
                                                 
23 For example, Fong and Luttmer (2009) find in a charitable-giving experiment that respondents who report feeling 
close to their racial or ethnic group give substantially more when victims are of the same race and Hungerman 
(forthcoming) finds that the charitable activity of all-white religious congregations decreases in the fraction of 
blacks in the community. It has even been documented that food giving is much more common in the animal 
kingdom among kin (Stevens and Gilby (2003)), suggesting that affinity for group members is a basic instinct.   19 
and owner through network ties. Specifically, drivers may have a higher chance of being 
caught driving with insufficient care when they lease in network versus out-of-network, 
giving in-network drivers greater disincentive to exert insufficient care, all else equal.
24 
B.  Theoretical model 
We now present a simple theoretical model of how owners choose which drivers to hire. 
The model provides testable implications that will help us disentangle the effort effects versus 
the screening effects. 
Using a modified version of a standard job search model, we consider the owner’s 
decision of whether to lease to a potential driver to whom he has come in contact. This is a 
discrete time, infinite-horizon model, where, for simplicity, the owners are infinitely lived and 
have discount factor  . As long as the owner has not hired a driver, the owner comes in contact 
with one potential driver per period. The potential driver’s ability, ʱ, is drawn i.i.d. from a 
continuous distribution F with mean ʱ
+>0 and support A, and represents the innate attributes of 
the driver that may limit the owner’s costs.
25 
If the owner hires a driver with ability ʱ, he gets a payoff of ʱ+e each period forever, 
where e 0 represents the level of effort exerted by the driver to limit the owner’s costs. If the 
owner rejects the driver, the owner receives a payoff of 0 this period and draws again next 
period. We also assume that the probability of drawing an ability ʱ<
+ is greater than zero. 
This condition guarantees that some drivers will be rejected in equilibrium. 
                                                 
24 We list this possibility because it has been used in the micro-credit loan market to argue that individuals may be 
able to monitor borrowers from the same group better than a large bank can monitor borrowers (for example, Stiglitz 
(1990)). However, later we will argue that this channel is unlikely to be important in the taxi market. 
25 To keep the model simple, we assume a new pool of potential drivers enters each period such that we have a 
stationary distribution over the abilities of potential drivers. This implies that if a driver is rejected, he does not come 
in contact with another owner-driver from whom he could lease (although of course he may remain in the industry 
and lease from a non-driving owner).   20 
Owners and drivers belong to one of at least two networks. Each period, the probability 
that the potential driver being considered by an owner from network j is from the same network 
is  j (again, the distribution over ability within network is the common distribution F). 
Effort effects 
We now solve the model in the case that owners fully observe the abilities of both in-
network and out-of-network drivers. The importance of the network in this case comes from the 
additional effort that driving in-network induces. We normalize in-network effort to be e=e’>0 
and out-of-network effort to be e=0. To solve for an equilibrium, we set up the standard Bellman 
equation, 
Vj(ʱ+e) = max{((ʱ+e)/(1-β)), βδj∫AVj(ʱ’+e’)f(ʱ’)dʱ’ + β(1-δj)∫AVj(ʱ’)f(ʱ’)dʱ’} 
The value function, V( ), which is bounded and weakly increasing, has a unique solution.
26 
The decision rule for an owner is simple. The owner will hire the potential driver if his 
ability plus effort is greater than the expected payoff of waiting for another potential driver. 
Thus, the owner uses a minimum cutoff level of his payoff ʱ+e in deciding whether to hire a 
potential driver. The expected payoff of waiting will be the same regardless of whether the 
potential driver is in-network or not. However, conditional on ability level, in-network drivers 
generate a higher payoff for the owner due to the positive in-network effort effects. Therefore, 
the owner will use a lower cutoff for ability for in-network drivers relative to out-of-network 
drivers in the hiring decision. The opportunity cost of searching for another driver, and this lower 
ability cutoff, generates a lower average ability of in-network relative to out-of-network drivers. 
 
                                                 
26 The transformation TVj( +e) = max{(( +e)/(1-β)), βδj∫AVj( ’+e’)f( ’)d ’ + β(1-δj)∫AVj( ’)f( ’)d ’} 
satisfies Blackwell’s (1965) sufficient conditions to be a contraction mapping. Therefore the value function has a 
unique solution.   21 
Proposition 1: Under effort effects, the average ability of in-network drivers is lower than the 
average ability of out-of-network drivers. 
 
Proof: The lowest ability driver that an owner will hire will be K(1-β)-e, where 
K=βδj∫AV(ʱ+e’)f(ʱ)dʱ+β(1-δj)∫AV(ʱ)f(ʱ)dʱ. This cutoff value is smaller for in-network drivers 
since in-network drivers exert higher effort. Therefore the average ability of in-network drivers 
will be lower that the average ability out-of-network drivers. 
 
Screening effects 
We now consider the effect of screening. For simplicity, we assume that effort is the 
same for both in-network and out-of-network drivers and normalized to e=0 (however, it will be 
straightforward to see that the prediction also holds under in-network effort effects). Under 
screening, owners can still observe the ability of potential in-network drivers (which he learns 
about through contacts within the network), but now cannot observe the ability of potential out-
of-network drivers. Thus, if the owner comes in contact with an out-of-network driver in some 
period, the owner treats the driver as if he has the average ability for the population, ʱ
+. The 
Bellman equation representing the owner’s problem is now, 
Vj(ʱ) = max{(ʱ/(1-β)), βδj∫AVj(ʱ’)f(ʱ’)dʱ’ + β(1-δj)Vj(ʱ
+)} 
which again satisfies the conditions for a unique solution. 
As before, an owner will hire a potential driver if the driver’s ability is above some 
threshold. This threshold may lie above or below the average ability of out-of-network drivers. 
This implies that, depending on the parameter values, owners hire either all out-of-networks or 
no out-of-network drivers that they encounter. The owner’s knowledge about the ability of   22 
drivers in their network allows the owner to be more selective regarding drivers in their network. 
 
Proposition 2: If out-of-network drivers are hired, they will have the same average ability as the 
population of potential drivers. The average ability of in-network drivers who are hired, 
however, will be higher than the average ability of the population of potential drivers. 
 
Proof: To show this we need only to show that some in-network drivers will be rejected. Let us 
show this by contradiction. Suppose that all applicants are hired. This implies that Vj(ʱ)=(ʱ/(1-
β)) for all ʱ. Therefore it is better to hire the lowest ability type ʱL than to reject and draw again.  
Accepting every applicant implies ((ʱL /(1-β))≥ β(ʱ
+/(1-β)).  But this contradicts the earlier 
assumption that there are some possible ability types that lie below β
+. There must be some 
ability types low enough that they are rejected in equilibrium. The average ability of in-network 
drivers accepted must be above the average ability of population of potential drivers. 
 
As before, information about a driver’s ability is useful to the owner. Some in-network drivers 
have sufficiently low ability that in-network owners reject them. Thus, the average ability of in-
network drivers that are accepted is higher than the average ability of potential drivers. Since 
out-of-network drivers appear to the owner to have average ability, owners hire all out-of-
network drivers they encounter if his hiring cutoff level is below the average ability in the 
population, and rejects all out-of-network if his cutoff level is above the average ability in the 
population. Thus, if there is an owner who accepts out-of-network drivers, the average ability of 
such drivers will be lower than in-network drivers. 
Finally, note that we have not specified the arrival rate of in-network versus out-of-  23 
network drivers. However, it is apparent that proportionally more in-network owners arrive 
versus out-of-network owners compared to their ratio in the population, as we might expect, then 
many or most hired drivers will be in-network, in particular under effort effects. We also expect 
that networks with higher ratios of drivers to owners have a higher arrival rate of in-network 
drivers. As Table 3 shows, these ratios vary considerably across countries, and the fraction of 
drivers who are in-network appears to be closely related to these ratios. 
C.  Disentangling screening versus effort effects 
From the model it is clear that the high rate of in-network leasing could be due to either 
effort effects or to screening, depending on the arrival rate of in-network versus out-of-network 
drivers and the parameter values. However, we also know that better in-network outcomes 
conditional on ability can only be due to effort effects. From Propositions 1 and 2, we now also 
know that in-network drivers will have higher average ability than out-of-network drivers under 
screening (assuming out-of-network driving occurs at all, and regardless of effort effects) but 
lower average ability than out-of-network drivers under effort effects but no screening. Thus, the 
outcomes of in-network drivers conditional on ability should be better than the outcomes of in-
network drivers unconditional on ability under no screening but worse than the outcomes of in-
network drivers unconditional on ability under screening. In summary, the effect of in-network 
driving on outcomes conditional on ability provides a test of effort effects, while the effect of 
conditioning the outcomes on ability provides a test of screening. 
 
5.  EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
Among the aims of this paper are (1) to document the degree and direction of any 
selection on driver ability into driving a taxi owned by someone from the same country, and (2)   24 
to remove any selection bias to uncover the causal effect (the effort effect) of driving a taxi 
owned by someone from the same country. To identify the casual effect of in-network driving, 
we use three distinct sources of arguably exogenous variation in in-network driving. Results 
from these separate sources of variation provide a robustness check on each other. 
A.  Baseline model 
  Our basic empirical strategy is to compare the driving outcomes of drivers who lease 
from an owner from the same country of birth to the driving outcomes of drivers who lease from 
an owner from a different country of birth. Specifically, we estimate the following model by 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), 
[1]    Yit =  Sameit + ln(Expit)  +  i +  it 
In [1], Yit is the outcome of driver i at time t, which is the number of accidents, convictions, or 
summons, Sameit is an indicator variable denoting whether driver i leases from an owner from 
the same country of birth at time t, Expit is the experience level of driver i at time t, ʱi is the 
unobserved time invariant ability level of driver i, and εit is the idiosyncratic error term. Because 
driver ability is not observed, the total error term is ʱi+εit. 
  OLS estimates of [1] are unlikely to yield the causal effect of in-network driving because 
owners may select the drivers to which they lease based on unobserved driver ability. As such, 
OLS estimates of β may be biased depending on the nature of the selection. In the presence of 
screening, where owners can better observe ability for same-country drivers such that same-
country drivers are higher ability, there would be positive selection and the OLS estimates of β 
would be biased downward (more negative). Alternatively, if owners know that same-country 
drivers will exert more effort, making owners more willing to hire same-country drivers of lower 
ability, there would be negative selection and the OLS estimates of β would be biased upward   25 
(less negative). As such, comparing the OLS estimates to estimates obtained from a model that 
isolates the casual effect of being a same-country driver will be informative about the selection 
process. We propose three strategies to remove the effects of selection, which we describe now. 
B.  Cross-country identification strategy 
The first strategy to isolate the effort effect is to aggregate driving outcomes to the 
country level and to use cross-country variation in leasing rates to test whether countries with 
relatively higher in-network lease rates have relatively better driving outcomes. Aggregating 
driving outcomes to the country level controls for any selection on ability into in-network leasing 
that occurs within groups of individuals from the same country of birth. This strategy will 
uncover a causal effect so long as differences in in-network driving across countries are not 
systematically related to differences in unobserved driver ability across countries. To implement 
this strategy we estimate the following model by OLS, 
[2]    Yct =  Samect + (ln(Expt))c  +  ct 
where the c subscript indicates a country-level mean. Since the model assumes that mean driver 
ability by country ( c) is uncorrelated with in-network lease rate by country (Samect ) after 
conditioning on mean experience by country ((ln(Expt))c), the estimate of the network effect 
isolates the effort effect. 
C.  Within-driver identification strategy 
  The second strategy to isolate the effort effect is to use within-driver variation in same 
versus different-country leasing. Specifically, with two observations per driver over time, in 
2005 and 2007, we can compare the outcomes of drivers who leased from a same-country owner 
in one period and a different-country owner in another period. By comparing the outcomes of the 
same drivers over time we effectively remove the contribution of time-invariant ability on   26 
driving outcomes (the contribution due to selection), thus isolating the effort effect. Specifically, 
we estimate the following differenced (within-driver) model by OLS, 
[3]    Yi =  Samei +  ln(Expi)  +  i 
All variables are defined as before, but now the time-invariant ability component is differenced 
away, so that the error term Δεi does not reflect the effects of selection. Identification of the 
effort effect β comes from drivers who switch from leasing from a same-country owner to a 
different-country owner (and vice versa). The identifying assumption is that any changes in 
unobserved characteristics that affect driving outcomes are orthogonal to changes in same-
country driving status over time. It is worth noting that this model estimates a local treatment 
effect for switchers who make up only 3.2 percent of the sample (58 drivers), so while the effect 
may be well identified it does not necessarily generalize to all drivers (note that this limitation 
applies to all within-entity models). This is one motivation for our use of two other completely 
different sources of variation to identify effort effects.
27 
D.  Cross-sectional instrumental variables strategy 
  Finally, we exploit the variation in leasing from a same-country owner that is due to the 
residential locations of drivers versus same-country owners. The idea is that drivers may be more 
likely to lease from an owner who lives nearby versus far away all else equal. Thus a driver who 
happens to live near a same-country owner should be more likely to lease from a same-country 
owner simply because he lives close to that owner. Using the 2005 addresses of drivers and 
owners, we compute the minimum distance of each driver to a same-country owner in the data. 
                                                 
27 Nevertheless, the observed characteristics of switchers are unremarkable. On average, switchers have 10.9 years 
of experience and are 44.4 years old versus 11.1 years of experience and 44.5 years old for non-switchers. Sixteen, 
12, 11, 9, and 9 switchers are from Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Haiti, and other countries, respectively, which is 
proportionally similar to non-switcher countries of birth. Twenty-five drivers switched to in-network leasing 
between 2005 and 2007 while 33 drivers switched away from in-network leasing between 2005 and 2007.   27 
We then use this distance as an exogenous instrument for in-network leasing to isolate the causal 
effect of in-network driving. 
To be a valid instrument, this distance measure must (a) be correlated with in-network 
driving, (b) not be correlated with unobserved ability, (c) have a monotonic relationship with 
being a same-country driver. Figure 1 shows clearly that distance to the closest same-country 
owner predicts leasing from a same-country owner. The effect however is most pronounced for 
distances of less than two-tenths of a mile, and for this reason we specify our instrument as an 
indicator for whether the driver lives in the same Census block as a same-country owner.
28 
Figure 1 also shows that distance to a same-country owner is unrelated to driving experience, 
which is the best measure of driver ability in our data. It is also clear from the figure that the 
relationship between distance to a same-country owner and being a same-country driver is 
monotonic. We present formal econometric tests of the validity of the instrument in Section 6.
 29 
  In summary, we exploit this variation in residential locations of drivers vis-à-vis owners 
to predict network status, and then use these predicted values in a regression on driving 
outcomes. Specifically we estimate the following system of equations by 2SLS, 
[4]    Samei = Disti 1+ ln(Expi) 2 + θ1c +  1i 
[5]    Yi =  Samei + ln(Expi)  + θ2c + 2i 
In [4] and [5] all variables are defined as before (but there is no longer any time variation), θc is a 
country of birth fixed effect, and the error term ν includes both the idiosyncratic variation and 
                                                 
28 Using same Census tract or log of distance to the nearest same-country owner gives similar though modestly 
weaker results due to a weaker first stage. 
29 A slightly different interpretation of the instrumental variable estimate is that leasing from a same-country owner 
who also lives nearby facilitates stronger network effects, for example, because an owner can better enforce social 
sanctions. However, the OLS estimates of the network effect are similar for drivers living nearby the owner versus 
far away from the owner, indicating that the existence of network effects is not predicated on geographic proximity. 
Regardless, the alternate interpretation would still indicate the presence of network effects.   28 
driver ability. This model exploits variation in residential locations of drivers who come from the 
same country of birth to remove selection to in-network driving. 
  To present evidence that our instrumental variables model is valid, we tests whether our 
distance measure is correlated with both our observed measures of driver ability and an estimate 
of the unobserved component of driver ability. In most situations where instrumental variables 
are used, authors cannot directly test the identifying assumption of their model (that is, that the 
instrument is uncorrelated with the unobserved error term). In our context, because we have 
longitudinal data but our instrument relies on cross-sectional variation, we can identify driver 
ability and then test whether our estimates of unobserved ability are correlated with our 
instrument. Specifically, we can obtain estimates of driver ability (ʱi) from our driver fixed 
effects model and then see if these estimates are correlated with the instrument.
30     
 
6.  RESULTS 
A.  Determinants of in-network driving 
One of the principal predictions of the model is that where there are screening effects or 
effort effects there will be much more in-network driving observed in the data than would be 
predicted by random chance or by residential sorting alone.  In this sub-section, before 
presenting evidence on the effects of in-network driving on outcomes, we provide compelling 
evidence that this central prediction of our model holds in the data. 
                                                 
30 We also use a mixed effects estimator to obtain the Best Linear Unbiased Predictors (BLUPs) of driver ability and 
find that these are also not correlated with our instrument. This mixed effects method for identifying BLUPs is used 
in Jackson (2010) and Woodcock (2009). See Woodcock (2009) for detailed discussion of their properties.    29 
Table 3 reports the number of lessees by lessee country broken out by the corresponding 
owner country.
31 The patterns suggest that owners lease to drivers within their network when 
they can. For countries with more drivers than owners, owners mostly lease to drivers from the 
same country, but many drivers do not lease from same-country owners. For example, there are 
291 Bangladeshi drivers but Bangladeshi owners lease to only 148 total drivers total, and 
consequently only 133 of 291 Bangladeshi drivers lease from Bangladeshi owners, while 133 of 
148 drivers leasing from Bangladeshi owners were Bangladeshi. For countries with fewer drivers 
than owners, owners often lease to different-country drivers, while most drivers lease from same-
country owners. For example, there are 12 Greek lessees but Greek owners lease to 52 drivers, 
and 10 of 12 Greek drivers lease from Greek owners, while only 10 of the 52 drivers to whom 
Greek owners lease are Greek. 
These patterns are consistent with drivers being more likely to lease in-network than 
would be predicted by random chance, and with there being a benefit to in-network driving. 
However, this is not a conclusive test. Given that many drivers may live in ethnic enclaves, a 
preference for proximity would also generate more in-network leasing than random chance. 
Given that 24 percent of drivers in our data lease from an owner who lives in the same Census 
block, it is plausible that the patterns are picking up a "proximity" effect rather than an "in-
network" effect. As such, showing that the pattern of in-network driving is not determined by 
proximity alone is key to showing that all else equal the likelihood of leasing is higher in-
network than out-of-network. 
To show this we test the hypothesis that the patterns observed in the data are driven by 
proximity alone and that the leasing decisions are not affected by the network status of the 
                                                 
31 The table reports 2005 data, but 2007 patterns are similar.   30 
drivers and owners. To do this we create an indicator variable equal to one if a driver leases from 
an owner who lives in the same Census block as themselves and zero otherwise. Under the null 
hypothesis that the countries of birth of the owners and drivers have no effect on the decision of 
from whom to lease, then conditional on having any owners in the same Census block, the 
country of birth of the owners should have no effect on the likelihood of leasing from an owner 
who lives in the same block. 
Table 4 shows results from a regression where the dependent variable is an indicator for 
whether the driver leases from an owner in the same block and the explanatory variables are 
indicators for having any owners in the same block and any in-network owners in the same 
block. The results show that the likelihood of leasing from a neighbor is 32 percentage points 
higher (p < .01) when there is an owner from the same country in the block. Also, conditional on 
whether there is an owner from the same country in the same block, having any owner in the 
block has a relatively small effect on leasing from that owner. The results provide a clear 
indication that the prevalence of in-network driving cannot be explained by proximity alone ─ 
indicative of there being benefits to leasing in-network. Having established the high prevalence 
of in-network driving (a central prediction of our model), we now turn to our estimates of driving 
in-network on outcomes.   
B.  Baseline analysis 
Table 5 provides regression evidence regarding the effect of in-network driving on 
driving outcomes. Column (1) shows OLS results for a driver’s number of summonses. Drivers 
leasing in-network have 0.09 fewer summonses (p < .01), which is a moderate-size effect relative 
to the standard deviation of the number of summonses per driver of 0.72. Driver country-of-birth 
fixed effects are included in column (2) to address the possibility that drivers from some   31 
countries are systematically better or worse in ways that are correlated with the probability of in-
network leasing and the results are similar.
32 In the OLS and all other specifications, when driver 
age is included, the estimate of the age effect is small in magnitude and not statistically 
significant after controlling for experience, nor does it affect the estimate of in-network driving 
effect. Including Census neighborhood characteristics, such as median income and education 
level, also does not affect the estimate of the in-network driving effect (although Census data are 
only available for 2005 outcomes due to address data being available only for this year). We 
therefore use the more parsimonious specification that includes only experience. 
C.  Country-level analysis 
We begin by showing in Figure 2 the relationship between the mean numbers of 
summonses per driver by country versus the fraction of drivers from that country leasing from an 
owner from the same country.
33 The figure shows clearly that driving outcomes are better for 
drivers from countries with more in-network leasing, with a switch of all drivers from out-of-
network to in-network leasing corresponding to 0.35 fewer summonses per driver. 
We can investigate the relationship more formally however by estimating equation [2] in 
order to control for the effect of any differences in average driver experience across countries. 
Column (3) of Table 5 provides these results, showing that the in-network leasing effect is 
substantially larger than in columns (1) and (2) and is statistically significant (p=.01). As 
discussed in Section 5, the country-level estimates identify the true causal effect of social ties on 
driver effort (separate from selection on ability) by eliminating any within-country correlation 
                                                 
32 Results are similar when the models are estimate with 2005 and 2007 data separately, and with Poisson and the 
more flexible negative binomial regression models, and are available in an online appendix. 
33 Data for countries with at least five drivers are included (55 countries) with the area of the bubble being 
proportional the number of drivers. Country labels for the points in the figure are not included because the TLC 
requested that country-level driving outcomes not be reported.   32 
between unobserved driver ability and in-network leasing. The identifying assumption is that any 
country-level differences in ability are uncorrelated with country-level in-network lease rates 
after controlling for country-level differences in driving experience. The estimate indicates that a 
country with all in-network driving will have 0.35 fewer summonses per driver than a country 
with no in-network driving. 
D.  Within-driver analysis 
Column (4) exploits the panel nature of the data to include driver fixed effects. The effect 
is substantially larger than the OLS estimate and is statistically significant (p < .01). As 
discussed in Section 5, this estimate is likely to isolate the true causal effect of social ties on 
driver effort as it controls for time-invariant driver ability, and hence removes any bias due to (a) 
selection across countries into in-network driving, and (b) selection within countries but across 
drivers into in-network driving. 
As a check of the identifying assumption that changes in in-network status between 2005 
and 2007 are not associated with unobserved changes in factors that may affect driving 
outcomes, we break out the effect separately for drivers switching from in-network to out-of-
network leasing between 2005 and 2007 versus from out-of-network to in-network leasing 
between 2005 and 2007. If the switching process is endogenous (for example, drivers tend to 
switch taxis after an accident but subsequently have safe driving outcomes), then the effect of 
switching into versus away from in-network driving might be different. Column (5) breaks out 
the effect for drivers switching away from in-network driving between 2005 and 2007 (“Lease in 
network”) versus switching into in-network leasing between 2005 and 2007 (“Lease in network x 
lease out of network in 2005,” which is additive to the “Lease in network” estimate). While 
drivers switching away from in-network driving show a larger effect, the estimates for both types   33 
of switchers are much larger than the OLS estimates, and the two types are not statistically 
different (p=.18).
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E.  Instrumental-variables analysis 
Column (6) and (7) contains the instrumental variables results, where the instrument for 
in-network driving is an indicator for whether the driver lives in the same Census block as an 
owner from the same country. The first-stage F-statistic for the excluded instrument is 131 and 
41 depending on whether driver country fixed effects are included, indicating a strong 
instrument. Again the estimate of the effect of in-network leasing is statistically significant and 
substantially larger than the OLS estimates (p=0.05). When driver country fixed effects are 
included, the estimate is very similar, though not surprisingly is less precise given the weaker 
first stage F-statistic.
35,36 
In Table 6, we provide evidence from falsification tests that the instrument is 
uncorrelated with driver ability. In columns (1)-(6) we find no evidence of a systematic 
relationship between the instrument and observed measures we expect to reflect driver ability. 
Columns (1) and (2) show in a regression of experience, the strongest predictor of driving 
outcomes in our data, versus the instrument, that the instrument has approximately zero effect on 
experience. Columns (3)-(6) show that the instrument also has essentially no effect on driver test 
outcomes we might expect to predict driver ability, which is whether the driver passed an 
English language test and the driver’s score on a driving test (these tests are described in Section 
3). Finally, we examine a direct measure of unobserved driver ability, the estimate of  i from the 
                                                 
34 Note that even though all drivers in the panel have two additional years of experience in 2007 versus 2005, the 
effect of log of experience is identified due to the nonlinearity of the measure. The nonlinear measure of experience 
is suitable given that the marginal benefit of experience almost certainly decreases with experience. 
35 Columns (6) and (7) also report the estimated coefficients on the excluded instrument in the first stage regression, 
showing that the instrument to be a very strong predictor of network status. 
36 Note that the sample size for these specifications is smaller than previous specifications since the instrument is 
based on driver and owner addresses, which are only available in the 2005 data.   34 
within-driver model. This puts us in the unusual position of being able to test directly the 
identifying assumption of the instrumental variables model, that the instrument is uncorrelated 
with the unobserved error term. Columns (7) and (8) show the effect to be approximately zero. 
F.  Analysis by summons type and alternative driving outcomes 
If effort effects are indeed driving the observed network effects, we would expect 
network effect to be largest for the types of summonses that directly impact owners’ costs. For 
example, we expect to find a relatively large effect for hazardous driving summonses since they 
may reflect more reckless driving and hence higher associated costs from accidents and 
mechanical defects for the owner; and for trip sheet, vehicle condition, and missing items 
summonses since owners receive a fine when drivers to whom they lease incur these summonses. 
These results are more speculative since we cannot identify precisely the level of moral 
hazard associated with each summons type and because test power is significantly lower when 
analyzing individual summons types. Nevertheless, the results in Table 7, which reports both 
OLS and instrumental variables estimates, are generally consistent with effort effects.
37 In-
network driving has the most significant effect on the three summons types that directly result in 
an owner violation: trip record violations, vehicle condition violations, and missing item 
violations. While the t-statistics for hazardous moving violations and for using the taxi unlawful 
purposes, which may also directly generate costs for the owner, are smaller, they have the correct 
sign, and the instrumental variables estimates are among the most negative.
38 
For the reasons discussed in Section 3, we have focused our analysis on summonses. 
However, we can also examine accidents and convictions for driving violations as alternative 
                                                 
37 We do not include country fixed effects, nor country-level or within-driver estimates, since there is even less 
power to identify these models when summons are broken out by type. The general patterns however appear similar. 
38 Results from t-tests and not coefficient estimates are reported since the baseline numbers of summonses across 
types varies and hence are not directly comparable.   35 
driving outcomes, albeit with less power for tests, and without a panel data component since only 
2005 outcomes are available. Accident rate in particular is an attractive measure because it 
captures an outcome that affects owners directly. 
Columns (1)-(4) of Table 8 report results where the dependent variable is number of 
accidents by the driver during the lease period. Columns (5)-(8) report results where the 
dependent variable is number of convictions for driving violations. For each measure, we report 
baseline OLS estimates, OLS estimates with fixed effects for driver country, country-level 
estimates, and instrumental variables estimates. Reassuringly, all of the estimates have the 
correct sign and a reasonable magnitude (although the country-level accident effect is somewhat 
larger). Furthermore, the magnitudes of the effects of same-country leasing on accidents, 
convictions, and summonses are all approximately proportional to their relative frequencies in 
the data. The country-level and instrumental variables estimates, which are likely to isolate the 
causal effect of in-network driving on driver effort, while imprecise, are again larger than the 
OLS estimates, indicating an important network effect and also that in-network drivers are lower 
ability on average than out-of-network drivers. 
G.  Discussion of sample selection 
Given that we only have data on individuals who became drivers, but not on prospective 
drivers not already in the industry, readers may wonder whether our findings are driven by some 
sample selection bias (as distinct from selection into in-network driving conditional on being in 
the sample). Specifically, given that our sample consists of drivers in the industry and not 
prospective drivers, readers may wonder if the better outcomes among in-network drivers are 
driven by high-quality prospective drivers being more likely to enter the industry as in-network 
drivers, while low-quality prospective drivers not entering the industry at all. Such sample   36 
selection could potentially bias the driver-level cross-sectional results (OLS and 2SLS). 
However, it is important to note that it would not drive the aggregate country-level results as 
long as the sample selection process was the same across countries (because this selection within 
country-of-birth will be averaged out at the country level), and it would not drive the within-
driver results (because all comparisons are within the same driver over time). Given the 
robustness of our central findings across models that are, and are not, susceptible to sample 
selection bias, we are confident that our results uncover a real causal effect. Moreover, all of our 
strategies that account for selection (conditional on being in sample) indicate that the selection 
into in-network driving is negative rather than positive, which is generally inconsistent with 
sample selection driving our results. 
 
7. EXPLORATION OF MECHANISMS 
The preceding section provides a range of evidence indicating that social ties between 
owners and drivers lead to significantly better driving outcomes in the NYC taxi-leasing market. 
However, as discussed in Section 4, there are at least five mechanisms through which social 
networks can operate, including screening, monitoring costs, social sanctions, social preferences, 
and social collateral, and we would like to know more about which mechanisms are important. 
First, we consider screening and monitoring costs. As discussed in Section 5, the 
estimates of the effect of in-network driving from the country-level, within-driver, and 
instrumental variables models are likely to reflect the true causal effect of in-network driving on 
outcomes, while the estimates of the effect of in-network driving from the OLS model represent 
both the causal effect of in-network driving and the effect of any selection of drivers into in-
network driving based on ability. Since the OLS estimates show a significantly smaller benefit of   37 
in-network driving versus the other estimates, we have evidence that selection leads to in-
network drivers having lower ability on average than out-of-network drivers. As the predictions 
from the theoretical model in Section 4 indicates, under screening, there should be selection of 
higher ability drivers into in-network leasing; while under no screening, there should be selection 
of lower ability drivers into in-network leasing. Since in-network drivers appear to have lower 
average ability than out-of-network drivers, screening is unlikely to be an important determinant 
of driver-owner matches and outcomes. 
There are several reasons why monitoring costs are unlikely to explain the better in-
network driving outcomes. First, taxis are operated primarily in Manhattan and typically far from 
the location of owners and members of the community (which are primarily in Brooklyn and 
Queens), and hence direct monitoring of lessee driving is infeasible at reasonable cost regardless 
of network status.
39 Second, most drivers in the sample lease from an owner-driver who himself 
regularly drives the taxi, giving the owner-driver some ability to regularly monitor vehicle 
condition again regardless of network status.  
Second, we examine the effect of network density on driving outcomes to learn about 
social sanctions, social collateral, and social preferences. Following Bertrand, Luttmer, and 
Mullainathan (2000) and Gil and Hartman (2011), we use Census data on the density of residents 
from a particular country in a neighborhood as a measure of the network strength among 
residents from that neighborhood and country. Specifically, we measure driver/owner network 
strength as the fraction of residents in the driver/owner Census tract from the same country of 
                                                 
39 One might argue that other drivers from the same country could observe a driver’s driving style while on the road 
and report this information to the owner. However, we believe this scenario is very unlikely because of the small 
chance that any single driver while operating his taxi would observe another driver he knows exhibiting poor driving 
style out of the approximately 40,000 drivers that are actively driving in the industry (short-term lessees, long-term 
lessees, and owner-drivers), also happen to know the owner of that taxi, and be interested in reporting the observed 
driving style to that owner.   38 
birth. While this measure may not capture network strength completely, it nonetheless should 
reflect the level of communication and ties between residents, for example, through the number 
of community organizations and events. The idea is to test whether denser owner or driver social 
networks generate larger improvements in outcomes, which may tell us about which mechanisms 
are important.
40 
Consider social sanctions, which would take the form of community-enforced 
punishments against an offending group member. These social sanctions would most likely 
operate through the owner’s network (and not a driver’s network) and hence a relatively dense 
owner network is likely central to facilitating social sanctions. Social collateral could operate 
similarly to social sanctions in that owners may provide or withhold favors to drivers based on 
driving outcomes and these favors could operate through the owner’s network. Hence the effect 
of social sanctions and possibly social collateral would be reflected in an owner network strength 
effect. In contrast, social preferences would likely operate independently of an owner’s or 
driver’s network. 
In Table 9 we report regression results where the dependent variable is a driver’s number 
of summonses and the explanatory variables of interest are an indicator for in-network leasing 
and the interaction of in-network leasing and network strength. Columns (1), (2), and (3) report 
results driver network strength, owner network strength, and both, respectively. Comparing the 
estimates of the interaction terms indicates that owner networks are far more important than 
driver networks for generating good outcomes. This result can be seen most clearly in column 
(4), where a stronger owner network leads to significantly better outcomes for in-network 
drivers. Furthermore, driver network strength has no effect on summonses after conditioning on 
                                                 
40 We examine 2005 outcomes only since address data, required to identify tracts, are available for 2005 only.   39 
owner network strength, and when fixed effects for driver country are included, the standalone 
in-network effect approaches zero, suggesting that network effects rely in large part on the 
density of the owner’s social network.
41 
In columns (5)-(8), the continuous measure of network strength is replaced with an 
indicator variable for whether at least 15 percent of residents in the owner/driver Census tract 
have the same country of birth. The idea is that a minimum density of residents might be 
necessary for a mechanism that operates through a local community to be effective, but that 
increasingly dense networks have marginally smaller benefits. Indeed, results from this measure 
are similar, but are now significantly more pronounced.
42 
The result that network effects appear to operate in large part through owner networks 
and not driver networks, and that the in-network effect is weak when the owner network is weak, 
suggests that social sanctions may be driving the observed effort effects. Social collateral could 
also play a role since there are ways in which social collateral could depend on owner network 
strength.
43 The limited stand-alone and driver network effects, however, are inconsistent with an 
important role for social preferences. 
 
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Moral hazard plays a central role in our understanding of numerous contractual 
relationships, and researchers have found evidence consistent with moral hazard in many 
contexts. However, much less is known about how one might mitigate moral hazard problems 
                                                 
41 The number of observations varies slightly across specifications due to differences in the availability of addresses. 
42 Fifteen percent was chosen because it corresponds to the level at which the marginal effect of network density 
appears to begin leveling off. 
43 One way that social sanctions and social collateral might operate is by making it easier for owners to collect 
damages from drivers with bad outcomes since damages may often be identifiable but not legally recoverable.   40 
where contract are necessarily incomplete. While there is some mixed evidence that social ties 
can mitigate moral hazard problems in group lending schemes in developing countries, little is 
known on the potential role of social ties in mitigating moral hazard outside of this particular 
developing-country context. 
In this study we investigate the role of social networks in aligning the incentives of 
economic agents in a United States labor market setting with incomplete contracts. Specifically, 
we compare the driving outcomes of drivers who lease from owners from the same country of 
birth to the driving outcomes of drivers who lease from owners from a different country of birth. 
We find that across three models that exploit three distinct plausibly exogenous sources 
of variation to account for selection, drivers have better outcomes when driving in-network 
versus out-of-network ─ indicative of a real causal effort effect. Consistent with social ties 
reducing moral hazard, we find that these effects are largest for outcomes that impose a cost to 
the owner. Also the marginal effects of driving in-network increase with the strength of the 
owner network but not the driver network, and appear to be weak when the owner network is 
weak. This is consistent with social sanctions, in the form of community-enforced punishments, 
playing a primary role in facilitating the network effects. 
Given the prevalence of in-network driving and the strength of the observed network 
effects in the taxi industry, our results indicate that social ties have incentive benefits in addition 
to any positive selection effects. In many labor markets, jobs are frequently obtained through 
referrals via social ties. It is commonly thought that the main benefit of these referrals is to 
overcome asymmetric information over candidate quality. However, our results suggest these 
referrals may also help to overcome the moral hazard problem. More generally, our findings 
provide direct evidence that even in developed nations with strong institutions, social   41 
connections can play a valuable role in achieving better economic outcomes. 
Finally, an interesting policy implication of the literature on micro-credit group lending is 
the possibility of introducing a joint liability program among groups of taxi drivers from the 
same network when there is an insufficient number of in-network owners from whom to lease. 
Given that responsibility for mechanical defects typically cannot be contractually assigned to any 
single driver, and that the costs of bad outcomes like accidents often cannot be recovered from 
individual drivers, group liability may induce a higher level of effort among these drivers and 
allow more flexibility in which owners and drivers can optimally form business relationships. 
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Notes: From top to bottom, the curves represent mean experience, fraction of drivers leasing in-
network, and fraction of drivers at that distance, all versus distance to an in-network owner. 
 




















Notes: Circle size represents the number of drivers from that country. The line is the fitted 
relationships between fraction of drivers leasing in-network by country versus mean number of 
summonses by country, unweighted by number of drivers by country (the weighted fit is similar).  46 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
   2005     2007 
   N  Mean  SD  Min  Max     N  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Years of NYC taxi-driving experience  1824  11.0  7.5  0.5  33.0    1877  11.2  8.0  0.8  35.4 
Lease from same-country driver  1824  0.45  0.50  0  1    1877  0.42  0.49  0  1 
Number of summons  1824  0.39  0.76  0  3    1877  0.33  0.68  0  3 
Number of accidents  1824  0.04  0.21  0  2             
Number of convictions for driving violations  1824  0.17  0.46  0  3             
Passed English language test on first try  731  0.90  0.30  0  1    957  0.92  0.28  0  1 
Driving test score on first try  743  78.6  10.5  0  100    967  78.2  10.5  12  100 
Fraction residents in driver's Census tract from same country  1677  0.06  0.09  0.00  0.85             
Fraction residents in owner's Census tract from same country  1678  0.08  0.15  0.00  0.94                   
Notes: The table shows summary statistics of the sample of drivers used in the regression analyses. Fewer observations are available 
for the English-language and driving test results because these data are only available for drivers entering the industry after 1997, and 
for fraction residents in driver/owner Census tract from the same country because of missing addresses. Accident, conviction, and 




Table 2: Availability of data on driver and owner country of birth 
   2005     2007 
    Country data available      Country data available 
       In network   Out of network         In network  Out of network 
All long-term lessees (N)  13,523  1,955  874  1,081    12,683  2,053  850  1,203 
Mean experience (years)  9.3  10.6  11.1  10.2    9.6  10.7  11.8  9.9 
Drive owner-driver taxis (N)  2,540  1,504  782  722    2,548  1,604  770  834 
Mean experience (years)  10.3  10.9  11.1  10.6    10.7  10.9  11.8  10.0 
Drive non-owner-driver taxis (N)  10,983  451  92  359    10,135  449  80  369 
Mean experience (years)  9.1  9.9  11.3  9.5     9.3  10.2  11.9  9.8 
Notes: The table shows number of drivers for whom country-of-birth data are available for both the driver and the corresponding 
owner, by ownership arrangement, along with mean experience levels.  
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Table 3: Patterns of matches between owners and drivers 
  Owner country   
Driver country  Bangladesh  China  Colombia  Egypt  Greece  Haiti  India  Pakistan  Russia  U.S.  Ukraine  Other  Total 
Afghanistan  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  13  15 
Bangladesh  124  5  2  2  7  16  18  4  22  17  2  53  272 
China  0  11  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  4  17 
Colombia  1  3  26  0  1  2  2  0  0  2  0  13  50 
Dom. Rep.  0  3  3  0  2  5  1  1  1  9  0  13  38 
Ecuador  0  1  5  1  1  0  2  0  1  3  0  19  33 
Egypt  1  1  0  18  3  9  3  2  11  2  0  14  64 
Ghana  0  1  1  2  1  6  4  0  3  7  0  28  53 
Greece  0  0  0  0  9  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  10 
Haiti  0  3  1  0  3  101  1  0  8  12  4  18  151 
Hong Kong  1  4  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  4  10 
India  6  2  5  3  5  15  278  11  19  8  6  34  392 
Morocco  1  0  1  1  1  6  1  1  1  1  0  10  24 
Nigeria  0  0  1  0  0  4  0  0  2  0  1  6  14 
Pakistan  0  0  1  6  5  29  36  106  22  21  4  55  285 
Peru  0  0  2  2  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  5  10 
Puerto Rico  1  0  2  0  2  1  0  1  0  4  1  6  18 
Romania  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  2  0  0  13  16 
Russia  0  0  0  1  0  2  0  1  21  2  10  14  51 
Senegal  0  1  0  0  0  2  0  1  2  5  2  3  16 
Turkey  0  0  0  0  0  0  2  1  1  0  0  3  7 
U.S.  0  1  0  0  2  7  0  1  0  12  0  12  35 
Ukraine  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  6  0  6  5  18 
Vietnam  0  5  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  8  15 
Other  3  3  12  7  7  23  11  6  27  19  4  88  210 
Total  138  44  62  43  50  235  359  136  149  127  40  441  1,824 
Notes: The table shows the country of birth for drivers and corresponding owners for the 2005 sample. Patterns for the 2007 sample 
are similar.   48 
 Table 4: Predictors of leasing from owner in same block 
Driver resides in same block as in-network owner  0.321*** 
  [0.020] 
Driver resides in same block as any owner  0.061*** 
  [0.017] 
Constant  0.009 
  [0.009] 
Observations  1663 
R-squared  0.249 
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if the driver leases in-network and zero otherwise, and is limited to the 
2005 sample since addresses are only available for this year. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in brackets. *** 
indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
Table 5: Models of summonses 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
   OLS  OLS  Country level  Within driver  Within driver  2SLS  2SLS 
Lease in network  -0.085***  -0.078***  -0.308**  -0.323***  -0.472***  -0.248**  -0.233 
  [0.023]  [0.026]  [0.125]  [0.092]  [0.146]  [0.126]  [0.227] 
Lease in network x lease out of network in 2005          0.268     
          [0.201]     
Log years of experience  -0.103***  -0.108***  -0.095  -0.288*  -0.298*  -0.082***  -0.086*** 
  [0.014]  [0.015]  [0.079]  [0.167]  [0.167]  [0.022]  [0.025] 
2007 indicator  -0.058**  -0.055**  -0.238***  -0.015  -0.013     
  [0.023]  [0.024]  [0.082]  [0.056]  [0.028]     
Constant  0.640***  0.647***  0.775***  1.102***  27.013  0.658***  0.686* 
   [0.037]  [0.039]  [0.200]  [0.331]  [56.905]  [0.071]  [0.368] 
First stage coefficient on lease in-network            0.312  0.189 
First stage F-statistic            131.4  40.9 
Fixed effects for driver country  No  Yes  No  No  No  No  Yes 
Fixed effects for driver  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Observations  3701  3701  174  3701  3701  1663  1663 
R-squared  0.024  0.063  0.084  0.033  0.035  0.007  0.063 
Notes: The dependent variable is number of summonses per driver. The 2SLS sample is limited to 2005 since addresses are only 
available for this year. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors that are adjusted for clustering at the country of birth level are 
reported in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.   49 
Table 6: Falsification tests for the excluded instrument 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  
Log years of 
experience 














In-network owner in block  -0.086  -0.075  -0.003  -0.018  0.880  1.520  0.005  -0.001 
  [0.055]  [0.058]  [0.027]  [0.031]  [0.974]  [1.085]  [0.038]  [0.042] 
Constant  2.074***  2.072***  0.903***  0.906***  78.363***  78.210***  0.015  0.016 
   [0.026]  [0.025]  [0.013]  [0.013]  [0.460]  [0.470]  [0.021]  [0.021] 
Fixed effects for driver country  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Observations  1663  1663  663  663  674  674  1663  1663 
R-squared  0.001  0.144  0.000  0.108  0.001  0.086  0.000  0.073 
Notes: The dependent variables are measures of driver ability (reported at the top of each column) and the explanatory variable of 
interest is the excluded instrument (in-network owner in block). The sample is limited to 2005 since addresses are only available for 
this year. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors that are adjusted for clustering at the country of birth level are reported in brackets. 
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
Table 7: Results by individual summons type 








(2005)  Corresponding TLC owner violation or risk 
Non-hazardous moving violation  169  0.95  84  0.28   
Stationary vehicle violation  104  0.00  30  -0.06   
Shift violation (primarily cell phone and smoking)  79  -0.37  35  -2.39   
Abuse (primarily verbal abuse)  64  -0.41  39  -0.10   
Passenger refusal  118  -0.43  43  -0.26   
Hazardous moving violation  95  -0.44  60  -1.99  Risk to taxi 
Passenger request violation  61  -0.69  20  1.10   
Noncooperation with TLC  104  -0.72  74  -0.12   
Using taxi for unlawful purpose  211  -0.98  96  -1.32  Risk to taxi 
Off-duty procedures violation  56  -1.02  36  -0.81   
Discourteous to passenger  85  -1.32  44  0.03   
Trip records violation  153  -1.70  90  -2.12  Missing driver records violation 
Vehicle condition violation (primarily safety related)  84  -2.06  34  0.36  Vehicle condition violation 
Item missing from taxi (primarily trip records)  184  -3.42  97  -1.82  Item missing from taxi (primarily trip records) 
Notes: The table reports sample size and the t-statistic for regressions of in-network driving on the probability of the driver incurring 
the summonses type listed in the left-most column. T-statistics for OLS regressions and for 2SLS regressions (available for 2005 only) 
are listed. The corresponding risk to the owner from the particular summons type is listed in the right-most column.   50 
Table 8: Models of alternative driving outcomes 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)     (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Accidents    Convictions 
   OLS  OLS  Country level  2SLS    OLS  OLS  Country level  2SLS 
Lease in network  -0.022**  -0.020*  -0.093**  -0.031    -0.035*  -0.030  -0.068  -0.057 
  [0.010]  [0.012]  [0.047]  [0.038]    [0.021]  [0.025]  [0.103]  [0.079] 
Log years of experience  -0.005  -0.002  -0.067**  -0.007    -0.017  -0.017  -0.104**  -0.017 
  [0.006]  [0.007]  [0.030]  [0.007]    [0.012]  [0.013]  [0.049]  [0.014] 
Constant  0.067***  0.059***  0.225**  0.074***    0.221***  0.220***  0.411***  0.224*** 
   [0.014]  [0.016]  [0.086]  [0.018]    [0.030]  [0.032]  [0.124]  [0.040] 
Fixed effects for driver country  No  Yes  No  No    No  Yes  No  No 
Observations  1839  1839  96  1674    1870  1870  97  1704 
R-squared  0.003  0.065  0.086  0.005     0.003  0.072  0.057  0.002 
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(4) is number of accidents and in columns (5)-(8) is number of convictions for driving violations per 
driver. The sample is limited to 2005 since accidents and convictions data are only available for this year. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 
that are adjusted for clustering at the country of birth level are reported in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent 
levels. 
 
Table 9: Models of the effect of network strength 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Lease in network  -0.093**  -0.079**  -0.074*  -0.026  -0.107***  -0.092**  -0.096**  -0.048 
  [0.040]  [0.040]  [0.042]  [0.050]  [0.037]  [0.037]  [0.038]  [0.044] 
Lease in network x driver network strength  -0.211    0.114  0.076  -0.004    0.078  0.086 
  [0.226]    [0.327]  [0.353]  [0.092]    [0.108]  [0.119] 
Lease in network x owner network strength    -0.397*  -0.665*  -0.634*    -0.152**  -0.218***  -0.221*** 
    [0.214]  [0.355]  [0.384]    [0.067]  [0.075]  [0.085] 
Log years of experience  -0.094***  -0.091***  -0.087***  -0.087***  -0.095***  -0.091***  -0.087***  -0.087*** 
  [0.021]  [0.022]  [0.022]  [0.025]  [0.021]  [0.022]  [0.022]  [0.025] 
Constant  0.625***  0.616***  0.608***  0.587***  0.626***  0.616***  0.608***  0.586*** 
   [0.054]  [0.054]  [0.056]  [0.060]  [0.054]  [0.054]  [0.056]  [0.060] 
Fixed effects for driver country  No  No  No  Yes  No  No  No  Yes 
Observations  1677  1678  1550  1550  1677  1678  1550  1550 
R-squared  0.020  0.020  0.020  0.109  0.020  0.020  0.020  0.110 
Notes: The dependent variable is number of summonses per driver. Network strength in columns (1)-(4) is fraction of residents in the 
driver’s/owner’s Census tract from the same country, and in columns (5)-(8) is an indicator for at least 15 percent of residents from the same 
country. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors that are adjusted for clustering at the country of birth level are reported in brackets. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.   51 
APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTARY RESULTS (FOR ONLINE REFERENCE ONLY) 
Drivers leasing from a family member 
Previous work in the context of micro-credit group lending finds evidence that network 
effects are weaker in groups where members have sufficiently close relationships, such as family 
members, suggesting a breakdown of the social sanctions mechanism (Sharma and Zeller (1997), 
Ahlin and Townsend (2007), and Karlan (2007) provide empirical evidence and Rai and 
Sjostrom (2004) have a theoretical analysis). We examine this issue in the taxi industry by 
comparing the outcomes of drivers who lease from a family member versus the outcomes of 
drivers who lease in-network but not from a family member and drivers who lease out-of-
network. Family member are identified as drivers who are registered as leasing from an owner 
with the same last name.
44 The sample consists of 326 drivers who lease from a family member 
(9 percent), 1,290 lessees who lease in-network but not from a family member (35 percent), and 
2,085 lessees who lease out-of-network (56 percent). The categories are defined to be mutually 
exclusive such that in-network and family member do not overlap. 
The regression results are provided in Table 10 and show that drivers leasing from a 
family member have 0.13 and 0.10 fewer summons than out-of-network drivers versus non-
family in-network drivers having 0.08 and 0.08 fewer summons than out-of-network drivers, 
depending on whether fixed effects for the driver’s country of birth are included. Thus, the 
results suggest that family members have even better driving outcomes than non-family in-
network drivers, and that the effect of social ties is monotonic in the strength of that relationship, 
                                                 
44 This method of identifying family members is imperfect: Drivers identified as family members are very likely to 
actually be family members since sharing a last name with drivers operating the same taxi is unlikely to be 
coincidental. However, some drivers who are family members may not be identified as such since drivers related to 
owners by marriage, for example, would not have the same last name. Nevertheless, family members classified in 
the data as non-family members are likely to represent only a small fraction of total lessees, and hence this 
misclassification is unlikely to affect the results meaningfully (and if anything will bias the estimate of the family 
effect towards zero).   52 
although of course it is possible that the selection process by which drivers come to lease from a 
family member versus a non-family member but same-country owner may differ in systematic 
ways. 
In-network drivers versus owner-drivers 
Table 11 shows how in-network lessees fare versus the owner-drivers from whom they 
lease, both relative to out-of-network lessees. As expected, the owner-drivers show somewhat 
better outcomes in terms of fewer summonses for driving violations. Note however that the 
selection process based on ability by which drivers come to lease in-network versus become an 
owner-driver may be very different, and hence a comparison of the magnitudes of these 
estimates is only suggestive. 
Alternative models and samples 
Table 12 reports results from the basic model of number of summons versus in-network 
leasing, but uses alternative modeling functions, including a Poisson regression model and a 
more flexible negative binomial regression model. Estimates for the later two models are 
reported as marginal effects. The results are nearly identical. The estimates in Table 13 provide 
results regarding the effects of in-network leasing for alternative samples. Columns (1)-(4) 
provide results for the 2005 and 2007 samples individually, showing that the in-network leasing 
effect appears robust to the sample period.   53 
Table 10: Outcomes of drivers leasing from a family member 
   (1)  (2) 
Lease in network from non-family  -0.077***  -0.076*** 
  [0.025]  [0.027] 
Lease from family  -0.132***  -0.101** 
  [0.039]  [0.042] 
Log years of experience  -0.104***  -0.109*** 
  [0.014]  [0.015] 
2007 indicator  -0.058**  -0.055** 
  [0.024]  [0.024] 
Constant  0.643***  0.649*** 
   [0.037]  [0.039] 
Fixed effects for driver country  No  Yes 
Observations  3701  3701 
R-squared  0.025  0.063 
Notes: The dependent variable is number of summonses per driver. Robust standard errors 
adjusted for clustering at the country of birth level are reported in brackets. ** and *** indicate 




Table 11: Outcomes of owner-drivers 
   (1)  (2) 
Lease in-network  -0.084***  -0.068*** 
  [0.023]  [0.025] 
Owner-driver  -0.122***  -0.105*** 
  [0.021]  [0.023] 
Log years of experience  -0.106***  -0.104*** 
  [0.012]  [0.014] 
2007 indicator  -0.042**  -0.043** 
  [0.017]  [0.017] 
Constant  0.637***  0.624*** 
   [0.033]  [0.036] 
Fixed effects for driver country  No  Yes 
Observations  5989  5989 
R-squared  0.034  0.060 
Notes: The dependent variable is number of summonses per driver. Robust standard errors 
adjusted for clustering at the country of birth level are reported in brackets. ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 5 and 1 percent levels. 
   54 
Table 12: Models of summonses with alternative regression functions 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
   OLS  Poisson 
Negative 
binomial 
Lease in-network  -0.085***  -0.084***  -0.084*** 
  [0.023]  [0.023]  [0.023] 
Log years of experience  -0.103***  -0.092***  -0.091*** 
  [0.014]  [0.011]  [0.011] 
2007 indicator  -0.058**  -0.055**  -0.057** 
  [0.023]  [0.022]  [0.022] 
Constant  0.640***     
   [0.037]       
Fixed effects for driver country  No  No  No 
Observations  3701  3701  3701 
Notes: The dependent variable is number of summonses per driver. Estimates in columns (2) and 
(3) are reported as marginal effects evaluated at the means of other regressors. Robust standard 
errors adjusted for clustering at the country of birth level are reported in brackets. ** and *** 





Table 13: Models of summonses with alternative samples 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
   2005  2005  2007  2007 
Lease from same-country owner  -0.108***  -0.055  -0.063**  -0.101*** 
  [0.035]  [0.040]  [0.031]  [0.034] 
Log years of experience  -0.096***  -0.095***  -0.111***  -0.117*** 
  [0.021]  [0.023]  [0.018]  [0.020] 
Constant  0.636***  0.610***  0.589***  0.617*** 
   [0.052]  [0.055]  [0.046]  [0.051] 
Fixed effects for driver country  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Fixed effects for driver  No  No  No  No 
Observations  1824  1824  1877  1877 
R-squared  0.021  0.097  0.025  0.064 
Notes: The dependent variable is number of summonses per driver. Robust standard errors 
adjusted for clustering at the country of birth level are reported in brackets. ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 5 and 1 percent levels. 